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Abstract
We identify the causal eﬀect of lump-sum severance payments on
non-employment duration in Norway by exploiting a discontinuity in
eligibility at age 50. We find that a payment worth 1.2 months’ earnings
at the median lowers the fraction re-employed after a year by about eight
percentage points. This is what we would expect if liquidity constraints
force unemployed workers to accept a job oﬀer earlier than would be
optimal. As further support for the liquidity story, we use data on
wealth before unemployment to show that the eﬀect of non-employment
duration occurs for the non-wealthy only.
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1 Introduction
Are unemployed households liquidity-constrained, so that they have to accept
a job oﬀer earlier than would be optimal? This is the argument implied by
Card et al. (2007a), based on evidence that Austrian job losers eligible for
lump-sum severance payments take more time until their next job than do
their non-eligible counterparts. Together with Chetty (2008), which shows
theoretically how liquidity constraints can aﬀect job search duration and finds
longer durations for those with (possibly endogenously) greater financial re-
sources in the United States, this has transformed the unemployment dura-
tion literature, which hitherto had assumed that unemployment insurance (UI)
prolonged search duration exclusively by distorting the relative price of being
unemployed rather than employed (“moral hazard”).1
Yet two questions remain: First, how generalizable are these findings from
Austria and the United States to other countries? The question arises because
both countries grant UI only for a relatively short period, maximally 6 months
in normal times,2 and because especially the United States has a more unequal
wealth distribution than the majority of OECD economies. Hence, one might
think that smaller or no liquidity constraints will exist in most other OECD
economies. Second, does the reduced-form eﬀect of severance payments indeed
reflect liquidity constraints in the sense that households are unable to spend
more resources while out of work? If so, we would not expect an eﬀect of
severance payments on non-employment duration of the wealthy, only an eﬀect
on the non-wealthy.
The present paper addresses both of these questions. First, we investigate
whether severance payments prolong job search in Norway, which has one of
the world’s most generous UI systems, replacing 62% of prior income for up
to 2 years, and also has one of the rich world’s most equitable wealth distribu-
tions. Despite these circumstances, which may be thought to render liquidity
1For examples, see Katz and Meyer (1990) or Lalive et al. (2006).
2After that period, households can still receive “unemployment assistance”, which is how-
ever lower and means-tested.
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constraints less likely, we find clear evidence of a causal severance pay eﬀect.
The severance pay amounts to about 1.2 months of net-of-tax median earnings,
which allow the job-seeker to “top up” from the 62% replacement rate provided
by the UI system to 100% of his prior income for about 3.2 months. These
payments are found to increase average non-employment duration by about
a month, and to reduce the fraction re-employed after 12 months by 8 per-
centage points, which corresponds to a relative reduction of 14 percent. Thus,
severance pay eﬀects do not seem to be specific to countries with relatively
short maximum UI durations.
Second, we investigate whether the eﬀect on job search duration reflects
liquidity constraints, as put forward in Card et al. (2007a) and Chetty (2008).
Our data includes pre-unemployment wealth measures, which enable us to use
the quasi-experimental variation in severance pay to investigate whether the
severance pay eﬀect diﬀers between the wealthy and the non-wealthy. More-
over, we exploit the fact that we observe various measures of household wealth,
both absolute and scaled by prior annual income, and interact these mea-
sures with severance pay eligibility. Across measures of financial wealth and
bank deposits, our findings confirm that the sensitivity to cash-on-hand is
mostly present for the presumably liquidity constrained. The response in non-
employment duration is substantial for those with below-median wealth, and
small or non-existing for those with above-median wealth. For the below-
median households we find that the severance payments reduce the fraction
re-employed after 12 months by 13 to 17 percentage points. These pieces of ev-
idence lend additional support to an interpretation of the severance pay eﬀect
as liquidity constraints, which due to data limitations the existing literature
was not able to provide.
Our identification exploits the fact that in severance pay agreements con-
cluded between the Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise and the Norwegian
Confederation of Trade Unions, only those aged above 50 on the day of their
job separation are eligible for payments. This allows us to implement a regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD), comparing those aged just above 50 to those
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aged just below. A number of tests verify that the two groups are otherwise
statistically identical along the relevant dimensions. Furthermore, the mecha-
nism of the pay-outs, which are made by a joint fund financed by employers
in a not experience-rated way, ensures that (as we verify in the data) there is
no selective layoﬀ behavior.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines
the Norwegian severance pay program and discusses our empirical strategy.
Section 3 introduces the data. Section 4 presents the general results on the
eﬀect of lump-sum severance payments on job search duration, and Section 5
provides separate eﬀect estimates for the wealthy and the non-wealthy. Section
6 concludes.
2 Empirical Strategy and Institutional Details
The challenge in identifying the causal eﬀect of severance payments in most em-
pirical setups is that eligibility or amounts depend on factors like age, tenure or
prior earnings which, however, are likely to be correlated with non-employment
duration also through other channels. To address this problem, we exploit a
rule under which employees separated from their job just before the age of 50
are not eligible for severance pay, whereas those aged just above 50 are. In
the immediate neighborhood of the discontinuity all other factors that might
influence our outcomes of interest can be expected to be statistically identi-
cal, so that any discontinuity in outcomes can be attributed credibly to the
discontinuity in severance pay. In this section we first describe important fea-
tures of the severance pay agreement between the Confederation of Norwegian
Enterprise and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, as well as some
relevant aspects of the Norwegian welfare system in general. Then we discuss
our empirical strategy.
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2.1 Institutional Details
While many firms in Norway have heterogeneous severance pay rules at the
firm level, those who are members of Norway’s Confederation of Trade Unions,
"Landsorganisasjonen i Norge" (LO) and the Confederation of Norwegian En-
terprise, "Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon" (NHO), have agreed on common
rules about eligibility and amounts of severance pay ("Sluttvederlag", SLV)
paid to employees who are involuntarily separated from their jobs. The LO
is Norway’s largest and most influential workers’ organization, covering about
850,000 Norwegian employees, or one-third of the Norwegian labor force.
For our time period 2002 to 2009 the magnitudes of the severance pay
from the program are plotted by age in Figure 1.3 It shows that the severance
pay amounts increased from zero to NOK 18,000 (USD 2,700) at age 50, the
discontinuity we employ.4 The severance pay from the program is tax exempt.
In our sample, median monthly earnings after taxes were $ 2,271 (see Table 1),
so the severance payment amounted to about 1.2 monthly after-tax incomes
for the median earner. For workers in this earnings range, the Norwegian
UI replaces 62% of previous earnings, meaning that the severance pay would
allow the worker to “top up” from the 62% UI replacement rate to 100% of his
former earnings for about 3 months, and top up to lower replacement rates
correspondingly longer. As is clear from this description, the size of this lump
sum amount does not depend on prior earnings.
A key advantage of the LO-NHO agreement for our identification is that
actual payments are made not by firms, but by a fund to which firms con-
tribute each month according to their number of full-time employees, and not
according to past layoﬀs. As our sensitivity tests verify (Section 4.2), this
ensures that there is no manipulation of the threshold in the sense of firms
trying to systematically lay oﬀ workers just below or just above age 50.
3For an overview of the exact severance pay amounts by period and age, see Table 2.
4There are also further increases at ages 52, 54, 56, 58, 59 and 60, as well as annual de-
creases after age 60. Worth noting however, is that the other increments until and including
the one at age 59 are rather small, and above 60 other simultaneous discontinuities apply,
in particular in access to early retirement and extended UI, thus violating the exclusion
restriction required for identification (see Section 2.2).
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Apart from the requirement that a worker needs to be above 50 years of
age at the day of separation, there are two other main requirements that need
to be met for the worker to be eligible for the severance pay. First, the worker
needs tenure in a firm participating in the LO-NHO agreement. At the day of
separation the laid oﬀ worker is required to have at least 10 years of continuous
tenure in the firm. Alternatively, the worker also meets the tenure requirement
if he has at least 15 years of continuous tenure in a combination of participating
firms, or if he has worked - possibly in several spells - in the same firm for at
least 20 years and his spell at the time of separation has lasted for at least
three years.
Second, only workers who are separated from their jobs involuntarily are
eligible for the severance pay. Involuntary layoﬀs typically occur in association
with plant downsizing, including closure, or financially necessary restructur-
ing which makes the worker’s qualifications redundant.5 The involuntary-
requirement applied for the severance pay is similar to the one applied for UI,
but there is no rule that the worker needs to file for UI to receive the severance
pay.
A worker is typically required to be given notice of a layoﬀ between three
and six months in advance. At the time of notification the employer submits
an application to the LO-NHO fund for the laid oﬀ workers, with a copy of
the resignation letter. Our contacts at the LO-NHO oﬃce has confirmed that
in the majority of cases the severance pay is payed out to the workers between
2 and 8 weeks after the last day of work. Since this is a one-time transaction
between the fund and the individual, details about a workers bank account
are not collected. Instead the payment is sent by mail in form of a cash check,
which the worker then deposits in the bank.6
5Workers in Norway are in general protected by relatively strict rules when it comes to
layoﬀs related to individual (mis)behavior (Addison and Teixeira, 2003). However a firm
may lay oﬀ workers if its demand for labor is permanently reduced, and the firm can verify
that other relevant work elsewhere in the firm cannot be found for each of the laid oﬀ
workers.
6For further information on LO, NHO, and their joint scheme, see
http://www.sluttvederlag.no/
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The welfare system in Norway is considered to be generous (Kautto, 2001)
and the participation in welfare programs is compulsory for residents. To be
eligible for UI, the individual must have earned a minimum amount in the
year prior to unemployment. This amount is adjusted in accordance to wage
inflation, and in 2007, for instance, the amount was about NOK 100,000 or
USD 16,000.7 Virtually any full-time worker will meet this requirement, and
will then receive 62% of the pre-unemployment earnings for earnings up to a
relatively high ceiling (about NOK 400,000, or USD 64,000, in 2007). The
maximum duration of UI is 2 years, but unemployed workers above 64 years
can receive UI until the retirement age of 67.8
While being on UI or when UI has expired, the resident is entitled to means-
tested social assistance to cover basic subsistence cost (no maximum duration),
or possibly to sick money or disability pension. Workers eligible for UI would
typically also meet the requirements for sick money given that a medical doc-
tor certifies that they cannot work (or seek work) because of sickness or injury.
The maximum duration of sick money is one year, and the replacement rate
is 100% (up to the same ceiling as for UI). When sick money has expired, and
medical or vocational training has proven unsuccessful, disability pension is a
common alternative (Markussen et al., 2012, 2011). The disability insurance
covers every person from the age of 18 to 67 and the replacement rate would
typically be about 67% (again up to the above mentioned ceiling). The main
requirement is that the person is incapable of supporting himself because of
a permanent disability, which needs to be medically certified. Though layoﬀs
or spells of unemployment are formally irrelevant when evaluating eligibility
for disability pension, several studies have documented that exposure to plant
downsizing or economic incentives aﬀect individuals’ drawing of disability pen-
sion (Rege et al., 2009; Kostøl and Mogstad, 2013). From the age of 67 every
resident is entitled to elderly pension, normally of the same magnitude as the
disability pension. We observe that about 70% of our sample end up finding
7Further, a worker may also be eligible for benefits if he or she over the last three full
calendar years has earned twice this amount.
8The oﬃcial retirement age in Norway is 67, but in practice, early retirement schemes
are available for a majority of workers in Norway from the age of 62 (Vestad, 2013).
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new work. Some of the remaining 30% will find work after we stop observing
them, whereas the rest will remain out of the labor force.9
2.2 Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy relies on the fact that employees separated from their
job just before the age of 50 are not eligible for severance pay, whereas those
aged just above 50 are.10 For those aged between 48 and 5211 and known to
have had 10 or more years of tenure, we estimate the following equation for
diﬀerent outcome measures y :
yi = ↵ +  Ti +  zi +  Tizi + "i (1)
Here T is an indicator for being aged above 50, z is the forcing variable
(age-50), and " is a mean-zero error term. So essentially we estimate the eﬀect
of being aged above 50, while controlling for the eﬀect of age per se. Since we
can make the interval small, we rely on a linear control for age,12 and we allow
the eﬀect of age to diﬀer on the two sides of the discontinuity. The specification
9Card et al. (2007a) report that 85% of their sample of Austrian workers is observed
with a new job before the end of their sampling period. The diﬀerence is likely due to the
considerably higher mean age among the Norwegian workers, since our study applies the
discontinuity in eligibilty to severance pay at the age of 50. The mean age in our sample is
50, compared with 31 in the sample of Card et al. (2007a).
10Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to exploit tenure as a RDD assignment variable.
While we can identify those with tenure above 10 years, our lack of information from before
1992 disables us from verifying that a worker does not meet at least one of the tenure
requirements (e.g. the rule of 20 years in same firm). See Sections 2.1 and 3 for details.
11With a view to the next, albeit small discontinuity at age 52, our baseline specification
uses a bandwidth of only 2 years, but using the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal
bandwidth of, in our case, 3 years turns out to produce quantitatively very similar estimates,
at greater statistical precision due to the larger sample size (see Tables 3 and 8).
12Our point estimates change very little if we instead control for age using a 2nd order
polynomial.
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does also allow us to add an interaction of T with diﬀerent measures of wealth
when we investigate how the severance pay eﬀect varies with prior wealth. To
maximize transparency and facilitate interaction of the treatment indicator
with further covariates, our baseline specification uses a rectangular kernel,
thus weighting each observation equally. This can be implemented by simply
estimating Equation 1 by ordinary least squares. The sensitivity checks (see
Table 8) reveal that our results are robust to the alternative use of a triangular
kernel, which assigns greater weight to observations closer to the threshold
and which Fan and Gijbels (1996) showed in general to be preferable for RDD
purposes.13
3 Data
Administrative data from the FD-Trygd events database of Statistics Norway
are used, and they cover the universe of Norwegian residents for the period 1992
to 2010. We start with information on all job separations by male employees
occurring on or before December 31 2008.14 This ensures that we can observe
job search for all workers separated from their jobs for at least two years,
which is also the maximum duration of unemployment benefits. We then
merge in information obtained from the LO-NHO oﬃce on which firms were
participating in the agreement and restrict to those that were. Furthermore, we
add information from FD-trygd on exact age at the day of the job separation,
and we restrict the main sample to those aged between 48 (inclusive) and 52
(exclusive) on the day of their job separation.
Since we do not explicitly observe which of the job separations are invol-
untary (another requirement for receiving severance pay), we exclude cases
13For background papers on the RDD approach, see Trochim (1984), Imbens and Lemieux
(2008) and Lee and Lemieux (2010).
14We focus on males as even in Norway females earn significantly less than their husbands
and they typically work part time. We have also investigated the eﬀect separately for
women. Since wives typically earn less than husbands, the household may be better able
to tap into the husband’s higher incomes to resolve potential liquidity constraints during
female unemployment. In line with this, no significant severance pay eﬀect is found for the
women.
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(using information from FD-Trygd) in which the job separation is likely to
occur because of some other event, after which individuals are likely not to
be searching for a new job. These are, first, separators receiving disability
pension in the year of their job separation, second, those on parental leave
(given the gender and age range of the sample, these are very few), and third,
those who return to the same firm within 3 months. All these restrictions will
reduce the fraction of voluntary quitters, but they may also introduce bias
due to endogenous sample selection. Luckily, however, we find that our point
estimates change very little when we lift any or all of these restrictions.15
As severance pay eligibility requires at least 10 years of firm tenure, we
restrict the sample accordingly (see Section 2.1). Since we cannot reliably
observe tenure before 1992, we can only be sure that the tenure requirement
is met for individuals who are in the job for at least 10 years after 1992.
This forces us to drop individuals who are separated from their job before
2002. Among the remaining individuals, we keep only those with observed
tenure of at least 10 years at the time of job loss. This reduces the sample
size significantly, but it guarantees that everyone in our sample does satisfy
the tenure requirement for severance pay, so that the discontinuity at the age
threshold reflects as closely as possible the full treatment eﬀect of the payment.
A last restriction from our data is that we do not observe the amounts
actually received, as would be necessary to compute the Wald estimate of
the eﬀect of actual severance pay on job search duration. Instead, like Card
et al. (2007a), we can only estimate the reduced-form or intention-to-treat
(ITT) eﬀect of severance pay eligibility, which constitutes a lower bound on
the eﬀect of actual severance pay. But with the other sample restrictions in
place, as explained above, and since the severance pay applications are sent
to the LO-NHO oﬃce by the employer together with the layoﬀ notification
(see Section 2.1), we can expect compliance to be rather high, and so our
ITT estimates are expected to be not much below the corresponding Wald
15We have also performed our analysis excluding workers who start a new job the day
after the separation. Again, results are unchanged.
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estimates.
We follow Card et al. (2007a) in using as outcome variable "non-employment
duration", defined as the number of days from layoﬀ until the start of a new
job, as opposed to the duration of registered unemployment. Their argument,
based on the findings in Card et al. (2007b), is that people may cease to register
as unemployed once their benefit eligibility runs out.16
Our first outcome measure is the completed duration of job search. One
drawback of this measure is that we observe it only for those who start a new
job by 2010. Furthermore, this measure is somewhat sensitive to the choice of
the duration after which we censor. Card et al. (2007a) censor after 6 months,
on the grounds that this is the maximum UI duration in their sample. In our
case the same argument speaks for censoring after 2 years, which we implement
throughout the analysis. We further define as outcome variables the fractions
re-employed after 12, 15 and 18 months, and we also plot the severance pay
eﬀect estimates on reemployment fractions for all durations of non-employment
up to 24 months.
Complementing this, we estimate a Cox regression in which the dependent
variable is (the logarithm of) the hazard rate, i.e. a person’s propensity to start
a new job given that he has not yet done so. This allows us to estimate the
eﬀect of severance pay on the hazard in any given day since job loss without
having to specify whether in general the hazard is increasing, decreasing or
flat in the time elapsed, however it does require us to assume that the eﬀect
is the same at all stages of the spell.17
16An additional reason in our case is that, as becomes clear from Bratsberg et al. (2010)
and Kostøl and Mogstad (2013), many individuals who would be labeled as unemployed in
other countries draw on disability insurance instead of unemployment insurance in Norway.
Similar considerations about moral hazard vs. liquidity constraints apply to those on dis-
ability pension as to those on regular unemployment insurance (see for instance Autor and
Duggan, 2007). In any case, when we perform the analysis excluding any household ever
receiving disability pension in our observation window, our main results remain unchanged.
17See Cox (1972) for the original outline of the Cox Proportional Hazard model, or Card
et al. (2007a) for another recent application.
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Given that the severance pay results in longer search durations (as we will
show), the match quality of the new job may also be aﬀected. Following Card
et al. (2007a) we proxy new-job quality by the change in earnings between
the old and the new job. We measure the growth in log earnings from the
calendar year before job loss to the calendar year after starting the new job.
In addition, we also proxy new job quality by looking at how long the worker
stays with the the new employer, captured by duration (again censored after
two years) and by the fractions who are still in the new job two years after
employment.18
A final data issue to be discussed is wealth. The existing literature on
liquidity constraints of households as well as on the illiquidity of real estate
during unemployment (Chetty and Szeidl, 2007) suggests to ignore real estate
and focus instead only on financial wealth (deposits, bonds, stocks and mutual
funds), or alternatively on deposits only. It also suggests to use wealth at the
household rather than at the individual level. Of course how long someone
can sustain the household with a given amount of savings will depend on the
monthly expenditures such as monthly rent, insurance payments etc, which in
turn will be highly correlated with prior income. The severance pay is also
constant and does not vary with prior income. Hence, we use both absolute
financial wealth and deposits, and both measures scaled by average annual
income across the last three years before the year of job loss.
Table 1 shows in the left panel the summary statistics for the sample on
which our main (bandwidth 2) results are based, and in the right panel those
for a placebo sample. Individuals in the latter sample, used for some of the
sensitivity checks below, satisfy all the same requirements as those in the main
sample, except that they come from firms not participating in the severance
pay agreement. Both samples have mean and median ages of about 50, and
tenure of about 16 years at the mean and 14 at the median. Uncensored non-
18This requires data on new jobs for the workers also after 2010, which are not yet incor-
porated in our main data source (FD-trygd). To keep our sample intact, for 2011 and 2012
we have made use of records from the Employer-Employee registry, which is the data source
used by FD-trygd.
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employment duration among those for whom the next job start is observed
in the sample (corresponding figure for the placebo sample in parentheses)
is about 10 (11) months at the mean and 2 (3) at the median. About 47
(40) percent have less than high-school education, 29 (24) percent have a high
school degree, and 24 (36) percent have a college degree. Average annual
income before taxes is US$ 44,885 (44,701) and household financial wealth
about US$ 41,310 (40,916) at the mean.
4 Results
4.1 Main Results
Our main results are displayed in Table 3 and Figures 2 through 5. The table
reports the coeﬃcients from estimating Equation 1: With the conservative
baseline of 2 years in the upper panel, and with the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) optimal bandwidth of 3 years in the lower panel. The two bandwidths
yield very similar point estimates, but the results from applying the wider
bandwidth has higher precision due to the larger sample size. T denotes
the indicator for being aged above 50, while z and Tz are the controls for a
linear eﬀect of (age-50), allowing it to diﬀer on the left and right side of the
discontinuity. In column 1 the dependent variable is the completed duration
until re-employment, censored after 2 years, whereas the outcomes in columns
2-4 are the fractions re-employed after respectively 12, 15 and 18 months.
Depending on the bandwidth, eligibility for the severance payment, worth
1.2 months’ after-tax salaries at the median, is found to prolong non-employment
duration by between 37 and 41 days. In line with this, amongst those eligible
the fraction re-employed after 12, 15 and 18 months is found to be about 8
percentage points lower. The same eﬀects can also be seen visually in Figures
2 through 5, plottng the completed non-employment duration and the three
fractions against 6-month bins of age, along with a fitted linear curve of length
2 on each side of the threshold. The graphs show that duration is indeed in-
creasing and re-employment probability decreasing in age, confirming the need
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for a quasi-experimental design. At the same time, despite the remaining noise,
the fractions re-employed exhibit a clear jump at age 50. To investigate the
timing of the eﬀect further we have also looked at the reemployment fraction
at all monthly stages during the first two years after job loss. Figure 6 shows
the eﬀect estimates from these 24 regressions on the fraction re-employed after
each month separately. We see that severance pay does not aﬀect the frac-
tion employed in the first months after layoﬀ, but it lowers re-employment by
around 8 percentage points from 11 to 19 months after layoﬀ.
This finding is also reflected in the upper panel of Figure 7, where we plot
the hazard rate against the days elapsed since job loss, separately for those
with and without severance pay eligibility. The continuous line represents
those aged below 50 at job loss and hence ineligible for severance payments,
whereas the broken line represents those eligible. The figure shows three inter-
esting findings. First, both lines are almost monotonously downward-sloping,
implying that the propensity to start a new job given that none has been
found so far is declining over time. Second, the line for those eligible is al-
most always below that for those not eligible, implying a lower job finding
hazard for the former on most days. And finally, the diﬀerence between the
two curves is largest after about a year, consistent with the above finding that
the diﬀerence in the fractions that have already started a new job peaks a bit
after one year out of work. The corresponding survivor functions for the two
samples are plotted in the upper panel of Figure 8, where again the continuous
line represents those aged below 50 at job loss. The gap between the groups
reaches the maximum after about 1.5 years and then starts to close.
The eﬀect of severance pay on the job starting hazard, as visualized in
Figure 7, can also be investigated by means of a Cox regression, in which
the log hazard rate is regressed on the covariates of interest. It allows us to
estimate the eﬀect of severance pay eligibility on the hazard, averaged across all
days within the first two years. This has the advantage of leaving unspecified
how the hazard rate changes over time, but it requires the assumption that the
eﬀect of severance pay is the same on any day within those first two years – a
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simplification which, as we have seen, does somewhat diﬀer from the pattern
reflected in our data. The results of this analysis, displayed in the last column
of Table 3, tell us that on average the payment reduces by 14-16 percent the
job-finding hazards displayed in Figure 7.
How does the size of the eﬀect compare to the one Card et al. (2007a) found
for Austria? In their case a payment worth 2 months’ wages lowered the re-
employment probability by 8-12% on average over the first 20 weeks after job
loss. In our case, a payment worth 1.2 months’ wages at the median lowers
the re-employment probability by about 8 percentage points, corresponding
to a relative decline of about 14%, as the average fraction reemployed after
12 to 18 months is about 0.55 (see Table 1). Hence relative to the size of the
payment our eﬀects appear somewhat larger. One likely reason for this is the
fact that we measure the eﬀect at later points in the spell, where many of
the Austrian job losers are presumably already back in a new job. Another
is the more generous UI: If households are willing to remain unemployed as
long as they can maintain consumption at say 80% of previous income (or any
other percentage above the UI replacement rate), then any given severance
pay amount will “last longer” the greater the fraction already covered by UI.
With the result that non-employment durations are indeed sensitive to a
lump sum severance pay, we may also expect it to aﬀect later job outcomes.
The fact that households choose to use some of the severance pay money for
longer search durations suggests that the severance pay makes them better
oﬀ. To see if the severance pay results in a better subsequent job, we have
attempted to follow Card et al. (2007a) and performed the analysis on wage
growth from previous to new job, and we have also looked at the duration
in the new job. The results are displayed in Table 4, where we also have
estimated the eﬀect of severance pay on the fraction that remains in their job
after 2 years. The results indicate that the severance pay may have a slightly
positive impact on the duration of the new job, and the fraction that remains
after 2 years, but a slightly negative eﬀect on the wage growth. However, like
Card et al. (2007a) none of these eﬀect estimates are significant at conventional
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levels.
4.2 Sensitivity Checks
The first possible concern that may arise about the credibility of our eﬀect
estimates is that our controls for the eﬀect of age may not suﬃce. After all,
an eﬀect of age per se is apparent from the Figures 2 through 5 and is also
reflected in the coeﬃcients on z and Tz in Table 3. To test this, Table 5
displays the discontinuities in our outcomes of interest for diﬀerent placebo
age thresholds, going in half-year intervals from age 47 all the way until age
51, after which the small discontinuity in severance pay at age 52 will come
into play. The table shows that indeed the only age threshold at which we
observe significant discontinuities in our outcomes of interest is that at age
50.19
The exclusion restriction represents another possible concern. What if
other policies that are correlated with non-employment duration do also change
at age 50? While there are discontinuities in early retirement access at ages
above 60, we are not aware of other policy discontinuities at age 50. One may
worry that some policy discontinuities do nonetheless exist. To explore this, we
repeat our analysis on a placebo sample of individuals who satisfy all the same
requirements as those in our main sample, except that they are separated from
firms which were not aﬃliated with LO-NHO and hence did not participate in
the severance pay agreements. The results of this test are displayed in Table 6.
Indeed, no significant eﬀect of being aged above 50 is found here, supporting
the view that the exclusion restriction is indeed satisfied.
As in any RDD, we need to explore whether there could have been selection
around the threshold. As discussed in Section 2.1 above, severance payments
19Note that as we approach the actual cut-oﬀ at 50, the bandwidth of two years implies
that the treatment group starts to include those actually treated (>50). Thus, a non-minor
(but insignificant) point estimate at age 49.5, for example, is not surprising since here the
bandwidth of two years implies that the treatment group (49.5 to 51.5) does in fact include
many of the men actually treated.
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under the LO-NHO agreement are made by a joint fund and financed in a not
experience-related way, thus alleviating concerns that firms might choose to
lay oﬀ (a selected group of) individuals just before they turn 50. By contrast
the fund has an incentive to ensure that firms and employees do not collude to
systematically postpone layoﬀs until after age 50, but how well does it enforce
this in practice? A first check is to test for discontinuities at the threshold
in the density of observations, following McCrary (2008). In the present case,
this test yields a coeﬃcient for the log diﬀerence in density of -0.129, with a
standard error of 0.130, so we fail to reject the null hypothesis of no diﬀerence.
In line with this, we see no discontinuity at 50 in Figure 9, which plots the
frequency of observations in our sample for each 1-month bin between age 48
and age 52, and the same story emerges for diﬀerent bin sizes.
While this suggests that there is no systematic selection of the number
of individuals to either side of the threshold, one may still worry that the
individuals on each side diﬀer in type. To check this, Table 7 reports the
results of repeating our main regressions on a set of variables of which the
values should be predetermined at the time of the job separation. Here we look
in particular at the financial variables also used to investigate the plausibility
of the liquidity constraints explanation, as well as indicators for respectively
higher education (other education categories were also tried and yielded similar
results), receipt of sickness benefits in year before job loss, and the share of
cases working in manufacturing (again, the result of no discontinuity holds
also for other sectors). These analyses, using the exact same methodology
as for our main outcome variables, do not reveal any discontinuities at the
age 50 threshold. This is also illustrated visually in Figures 10 through 16,
lending further support to the view that our main findings can be given a
causal interpretation.
Another concern that always arises in a RDD is how sensitive the results
are to the choice of diﬀerent bandwidths or kernels. In general the trade-oﬀ is
between limited precision at very narrow bandwidths and potential bias at too
wide bandwidths. Our rather conservative default choice of 2 years on each
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side has been motivated by the desire to avoid any bias from the next, albeit
small discontinuity in severance pay amounts at age 52 (cf. Figure 1). This
said, Table 8 displays the results of varying the bandwidth. The four columns
show these for the same four outcomes (completed duration, and fractions
re-employed after 12, 15 and 18 months). The top panel provides the results
from varying the bandwidth but keeping the rectangular kernel. The bottom
panel provides results using a triangular kernel. In both panels we show first
the results obtained under the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) “optimal
bandwidth”, which varies a bit across outcome variables, but is around 3 years
in the top and around 4 years in the bottom panel. Then we show results
obtained when using half the optimal bandwidth. The point estimates are
slightly larger than with our conservative 2-year bandwidth choice and are
also more significant. In general, they confirm our main results.
5 Liquidity Constraints?
In the previous section we have shown that the causal eﬀect of lump-sum sev-
erance payments on job search duration which Card et al. (2007a) found for
Austria is also present in Norway, making it plausible that the finding applies
also to other OECD economies. But given that Norway has both a more egali-
tarian wealth distribution and a more generous welfare state than for instance
Austria or the United States, the question arises whether the severance pay
eﬀect does indeed reflect liquidity constraints. Clearly, if the correct interpre-
tation is one of liquidity constraints, then the same severance payment should
have a smaller eﬀect on those with higher prior wealth, especially when scaled
by prior income, as they should have enough other resources to tap into. Fur-
ther, if we interpret previous income as a proxy for previous expenditures,
households with a high wealth level relative to previous income will be able to
sustain previous expenditure levels longer after job loss. Thus, it would seem
plausible that households with little wealth relative to prior income could run
into liquidity constraints faster, and for these households the eﬀect of severance
pay could be more pronounced.
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Table 9 provides results from the RDD where we have interacted severance
pay eligibility with the indicator for whether household holdings of financial
wealth and deposits exceeded the sample median (before job loss). We use both
the absolute holdings, and holdings relative to annual income in the last year
before job loss. For example, in the first column of Table 9 the interaction term
is decided by the level of household pre-unemployment holdings of financial
wealth. For the outcome measure Re-Employed After 15 Months, we find that
the severance pay reduces the likelihood of re-employment after 15 months
by 17.39 percentage points for the households with financial wealth below the
median. For the above-median households, the eﬀect is virtually zero and
clearly not significantly diﬀerent from zero at any conventional level. Our
main results, estimated on the whole sample in Table 3, are thus the average
of the fairly strong eﬀects for those with below-median holdings and the zero
eﬀects for those with above-median holdings. This picture is confirmed for the
other liquidity proxies in the table. Hence, we provide first evidence in favor
of a liquidity constraints interpretation in a setting with quasi-experimental
assignment of severance pay.
6 Conclusion
We have documented a causal eﬀect of lump-sum severance payments on the
duration of job search in Norway. To our knowledge, this is only the second
paper in the literature to find such a causal eﬀect (after Card et al. 2007a),
and the first to find it in a Scandinavian-type welfare state. This makes it
likely that such eﬀects hold also in other OECD economies.
But given that Norway has both a more egalitarian wealth distribution and
a more generous welfare state than for instance Austria or the United States,
the question arises whether the severance pay eﬀect does indeed reflect liquidity
constraints. We have investigated how the size of the severance pay eﬀect
varies with prior wealth, and we find no eﬀect for those with above-median
wealth and large eﬀects for those with below-median wealth. This provides
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the first piece of evidence in favor of the liquidity constraints interpretation in
a quasi-experimental setting.
The implication of this finding is that in most OECD economies there exists
a subset of job losers who, with no or insuﬃciently generous unemployment
insurance, have to accept a new job oﬀer earlier than would be optimal. A pos-
sibly eﬃcient way to improve their situation would be to lend them additional
resources, as this policy response could come without the cost of increased
moral hazard. Where such lending is not possible, for instance for political
reasons, the choice of the optimal generosity of unemployment insurance must
still weigh the eﬀects of the liquidity constraints against those of potential
moral hazard.
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Figure 1: Severance Pay Amounts in USD by Age
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Note: The figure plots the aeverance pay amount that an eligible worker would have received if laid oﬀ
between 2002 and 2009, for each 6-month bin of age. Amounts have been converted to USD at the average
exchange rate prevalent in 2004.
Figure 2: Non-Employment Duration After Job Loss
30
0
35
0
40
0
45
0
N
on
−
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t D
ur
at
io
n 
in
 D
ay
s
45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55
Age
Note: The figure shows the average duration from job loss until the next regular job plotted against 6-month
bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our
default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 3: Fraction Re-Employed 12 Months After Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows the fraction re-employed after 12 months, plotted against 6-month bins of age at job
loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default bandwidth
of 2 years.
Figure 4: Fraction Re-Employed 15 Months After Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows the fraction re-employed after 15 months plotted against 6-month bins of age at job
loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default bandwidth
of 2 years.
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Figure 5: Fraction Re-Employed 18 Months After Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows the fraction re-employed after 18 months, plotted against 6-month bins of age at job
loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default bandwidth
of 2 years.
Figure 6: Fraction Re-Employed 1-24 months
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Note: The figure shows the eﬀect estimates from 24 regressions (using baseline specification from Table 3,
Panel A) when measuring the outcome variable as the fraction re-employed after each month from the first
month up to 24 months after job loss. Stipled lines indicate the 95% point-wise confidence intervals.
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Figure 7: Hazard Rates in the Main and the Placebo sample
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Note: The figure shows in the upper panel the hazard rates against the number of days elaped since job loss
in our main sample. The hazard is almost always higher for those aged below 50 and hence not eligible for
a severance payment at age 50. In the lower panel, the figure plots the hazard rates of finding new jobs for
workers coming out of a job in the placebo firm sample.
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Figure 8: Survivor functions in the Main and the Placebo sample
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
Fr
ac
tio
n 
w
ith
ou
t a
 N
ew
 J
ob
0 200 400 600 800
Days since Job Loss (Main Plants Sample)
Aged below 50 at Job Loss Aged above 50 at Job Loss
0.
00
0.
25
0.
50
0.
75
1.
00
Fr
ac
tio
n 
w
ith
ou
t a
 N
ew
 J
ob
0 200 400 600 800
Days since Job Loss (Placebo Plants Sample)
Aged below 50 at Job Loss Aged above 50 at Job Loss
Note: The figure shows in the upper panel the survivor functions, the fraction without a new job, against
the number of days elaped since job loss in our main sample split at the age of 50. In the lower panel, the
figure plots the survivor function for workers (above and below the age of 50) coming out of a job in the
placebo firm sample.
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Figure 9: Frequency of Job Separations
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Note: The figure shows the frequencies of job separations around the threshold at age 50, using monthly
bins. Corresponding to the visual impression, an estimation of the density of observations, following McCrary
(2008), yields a coeﬃcient of -0.129 and a standard error of 0.130, thus failing to reject the null hypothesis
of no diﬀerence in densities.
Figure 10: Household Total Wealth in the Year before Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows total household wealth (financial wealth plus real estate holdings), plotted against
6-month bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted on each side for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 11: Household Financial Wealth in the Year before Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows the households’ financial wealth plotted against 6-month bins of age at job loss.
Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default bandwidth of 2
years.
Figure 12: Household Deposits in the Year before Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows the households’ deposits plotted against 6-month bins of age at job loss. Linear
curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 13: Household Income in the Year before Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows household income plotted against 6-month bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are
fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default bandwidth of 2 years.
Figure 14: Share of Households with Higher Education in the Year before
Job Loss
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Note: The figure shows the share of households having a higher education, both plotted against 6-month
bins of age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our
default bandwidth of 2 years.
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Figure 15: Share of Households receiving Sickness Money before Job Loss
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Note: The figure the fraction of households receiving sickness moneyplotted against 6-month bins of age
at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default
bandwidth of 2 years.
Figure 16: Share of Households Employed in Manufacturing before Job
Loss
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Note: The figure shows the share of households employed in manufacturing plotted against 6-month bins of
age at job loss. Linear curves are fitted separately on each side of the age 50 discontinuity, for our default
bandwidth of 2 years.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics, Estimation And Placebo Samples, Age 48-52
Estimation (N=2,342) Placebo (N=9,340)
Mean Std Dev Median Mean Std Dev Median
Year 2,003 3.82 2,003 2,003 3.94 2,003
Age 50.02 1.17 50.02 50.00 1.15 50.00
Tenure (in years) 15.979 5.41 14.16 16.02 5.48 14.54
Dur NonEmpl (in days) 293.28 494.82 72.50 337.01 554.47 112.00
Fraction Re-Employed After (in %):
12 Months 51.90 48.54
15 Months 54.34 51.87
18 Months 56.39 54.08
Education (in %)
Less than Highschool 47.0 40.1
High School 28.6 23.9
College 24.4 36.0
Education Main Field (in %)
General 32.0 26.9
Humanities 1.7 4.6
Teaching 1.5 6.2
Econ/Adm 9.8 12.7
Science/Eng 45.9 33.7
Health/Sports 1.1 4.4
Primary 3.5 2.7
Services 3.6 6.5
Industry (in %)
Manufacturing 24.1 27.3
Construction 8.7 7.9
Wholesale / Retail 14.8 19.8
Transport / Communication 10.4 9.8
Real estate 8.5 10.9
Health / Social work 6.1 2.4
Financial Variables (in 2004 USD):
Annual Earnings 44,885 22,374 38,939 44,701 23,474 39,348
Monthly Earnings After Tax 2,618 1,305 2,271 2,608 1,369 2,295
HH Annual Earnings 60,011 29,599 55,499 60,752 31,480 55,538
Deposits 13,144 28,351 3,497 14,752 30,761 3,748
HH Deposits 17,952 34,957 5,864 19,872 36,505 6,724
Financial Wealth 32,982 94,430 4,919 32,542 82,272 6,058
HH Financial Wealth 41,310 107,126 8,464 40,916 95,201 10,639
Wealth 75,433 121,984 44,437 77,704 112,460 46,685
HH Wealth 92,093 138,035 57,644 95,131 129,129 59,347
Note: This table displays in the left panel summary statistics for the sample of 2,342 households, aged between 48 and
52 satisfying all the criteria described in Section 3. Additionally, summary statistics for the placebo sample of 9,340
households (satisfying all the same criteria except that the firm of separation was participating in the severance pay
agreements) are displayed in the right panel. For the duration of non-employment, summary statistics are reported
for households who have found jobs within the sample window (before 31 Dec 2008). Smaller Education Fields and
Industries are omitted for spatial reasons. Financial variables and income are measured two years before the year of
job separation and the values are denoted in 2004 USD.
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Table 2: Severance Pay Amounts In NOK and USD By Age And Period
Age Oct 1993- Oct 1995- Mar 1998- Aug 2002-
NOK USD NOK USD NOK USD NOK USD
6 49 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
50 - 51 12,000 1,791 14,400 2,149 14,400 2,149 18,000 2,687
52 - 53 13,000 1,940 15,600 2,328 15,600 2,328 19,500 2,910
54 - 55 15,500 2,313 18,600 2,776 18,600 2,776 23,300 3,478
56 - 57 18,000 2,687 21,500 3,209 21,500 3,209 26,900 4,015
58 20,000 2,985 24,000 3,582 24,000 3,582 30,000 4,478
59 22,500 3,358 27,000 4,030 27,000 4,030 33,800 5,045
60 24,000 3,582 28,800 4,299 28,800 4,299 36,000 5,373
61 26,000 3,881 31,200 4,657 31,200 4,657 39,000 5,821
62 28,500 4,254 34,200 5,104 57,000 8,507 57,000 8,507
63 28,500 4,254 34,200 5,104 45,600 6,806 45,600 6,806
64 34,200 5,104 34,200 5,104 34,200 5,104 34,200 5,104
65 22,800 3,403 22,800 3,403 22,800 3,403 22,800 3,403
66 11,400 1,701 11,400 1,701 11,400 1,701 11,400 1,701
Note: The table displays predicted Severance Pay in NOK (and USD) by age and period,
according to the Severance Pay agreements between the Confederation of Norwegian Enter-
prise (NHO) and the Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions (LO). For a plot of predicted
amounts (in the last period) in 2004 USD, see Figure 1. 6.7 NOK = 1 USD (2004).
34
Table 3: Baseline Specification, Main Outcomes
Completed Fraction Re-Employed After: Cox
Duration 12 Months 15 Months 18 Months Regression
Panel A: Bandwidth = 2:
T 36.87 -8.27⇤⇤ -8.77⇤⇤ -7.93⇤ -0.14
(26.23) (4.03) (4.04) (4.08) (0.11)
z 13.07 -0.58 -0.61 -2.30 -0.07
(15.66) (2.43) (2.44) (2.39) (0.06)
Tz -6.91 0.75 0.98 3.13 0.05
(37.45) (3.48) (3.47) (3.45) (0.09)
Constant 360.47⇤⇤⇤ 55.74⇤⇤⇤ 58.31⇤⇤⇤ 58.86⇤⇤⇤
(18.75) (2.91) (2.90) (2.88)
N 2,342 2,342 2,342 2,342 2,342
Panel B: Bandwidth = 3 (Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal):
T 40.53⇤ -7.34⇤⇤ -8.01⇤⇤ -7.80⇤⇤ -0.16⇤
(21.83) (3.33) (3.35) (3.38) (0.09)
z 0.32 0.05 0.32 -0.13 -0.01
(8.49) (1.32) (1.31) (1.30) (0.03)
Tz 8.37 -0.64 -0.95 -0.53 -0.02
(12.40) (1.91) (1.91) (1.90) (0.05)
Constant 351.96⇤⇤⇤ 55.90⇤⇤⇤ 58.87⇤⇤⇤ 60.41⇤⇤⇤
(15.84) (2.45) (2.43) (2.41)
N 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540 3,540
Note: The table provides the regression discontinuity estimates based on Equation 1 and
using our baseline bandwidth of 2 years on each side in the upper panel, and the bandwidth
of 3 years (Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal) in the lower. T is the indicator for
being aged above 50 and hence eligible for severance pay, z is the age control (age-50) on the
left side and Tz allows another age control on the right side of the threshold. Non-employment
durations are censored when unemployment benefit expires after 2 years. Standard errors,
clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 4: Eﬀect of Severance Pay on Next Job Quality
New Job Fraction in New Cox Change in
Duration Job 2 years Regression log Salary
T 22.20 0.05 -0.17 -0.015
(18.90) (0.04) (0.17) (0.009)
z -11.17 -0.02 0.08 0.004
(10.38) (0.03) (0.10) (0.006)
Tz -8.37 -0.02 0.09 0.000
(15.73) (0.04) (0.14) (0.007)
Constant 612.54⇤⇤⇤ 0.69⇤⇤⇤ -0.034⇤⇤⇤
(13.03) (0.03) (0.007)
N 1,644 1,644 1,644 1,644
Note: The table provides the regression discontinuity estimates of Equation 1
using our baseline bandwidth of 2 years on each side, on the eﬀect of next job
quality. Column 1 shows the estimate of the eﬀect on the duration in the new job
censored after 2 years (we can only observe durations of new jobs until Dec 31
2012), column 2 on the fraction still in the new job after 2 years, column 3 the
estimate from a Cox hazard model for the duration of the next job (censored after
2 years) and column 4 the eﬀect on the change in log annual earnings in the year
before job loss to the year after job start for those finding a new job within our
sample window. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 6: Placebo Plants: Baseline Specification, Main Outcomes
Completed Fraction Re-Employed After: Cox
Duration 12 Months 15 Months 18 Months Regression
T -4.132 -0.138 -0.392 -0.282 0.009
(13.026) (2.040) (2.031) (2.051) (0.054)
z 11.602 -0.893 -0.593 -0.669 -0.040
(8.337) (1.286) (1.278) (1.271) (0.033)
Tz -0.222 -1.257 -1.046 -0.748 0.007
(11.514) (1.791) (1.785) (1.776) (0.047)
Constant 398.037*** 49.213*** 52.576*** 54.579***
(12.074) (1.766) (1.747) (1.721)
N 9,340 9,340 9,340 9,340 9,340
Note: The table repeats the main regressions from Table 3 for our placebo sample of individ-
uals separated from firms that were not aﬃliated with LO-NHO and hence did not participate
in the severance pay agreements (see Section 2 for details). As before, we estimate Equation
1, using our baseline bandwidth of 2 years on each side. T is the indicator for being aged
above 50 and hence "eligible" for severance pay, z is the control for (age-50) on the left side,
and Tz allows for another age control on the right side of the threshold. Non-employment
durations are censored when unemployment benefit expires after 2 years. Standard errors,
clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 8: Alternative Optimal Bandwidths: Main Outcomes
Completed Fraction Re-Employed After
Rectangular Kernel: Duration 12 Months 15 Months 18 Months
Optimal Bandwidth 40.24* -7.14** -7.27** -7.41**
(20.95) (3.17) (3.15) (3.15)
N 3,782 3,866 3,877 4,096
0.5*Opt Bw 37.55 -7.63* -8.29* -7.26
(29.47) (4.46) (4.46) (4.44)
N 1,851 1,911 1,915 2,009
Optimal Bandwidth 3.22 3.31 3.32 3.49
Triangular Kernel:
Optimal Bandwidth 41.11** -7.61** -8.07*** -7.75***
(20.29) (3.06) (3.06) (3.01)
N 4,843 4,978 5,005 5,300
0.5* Opt Bw 35.73 -8.40** -8.33* -7.36*
(28.29) (4.28) (4.27) (4.22)
N 2,405 2,462 2,465 2,591
Optimal Bandwidth 4.10 4.21 4.23 4.45
Note: This table displays only the coeﬃcients, and in parentheses the standard errors
clustered by firm, on being aged above 50, now for diﬀerent bandwidths and kernels. The
top panel follows our main estimates in using a rectangular kernel, with equal weighting
of observations. The bottom panel uses a triangular kernel, putting greater weight on
observations closer to the threshold. Within each panel, we display first the estimates
based on the Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) optimal bandwidth and then those based
on half the optimal bandwidth. The respective optimal bandwidth itself is displayed at
the bottom of each panel. Non-employment durations are censored when unemployment
benefit expires after 2 years. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 9: Stratifying By Wealth Measures: Above Median (D)
Fin Wealth Deposits Finw/Inc Dep/Inc
Completed T 97.59⇤⇤⇤ 98.66⇤⇤⇤ 67.95⇤ 73.14⇤⇤
Duration (37.76) (36.30) (36.92) (36.09)
T*D -118.48⇤⇤ -120.41⇤⇤ -63.91 -73.85
(55.70) (53.32) (55.25) (53.51)
Re-Employed After T -16.78⇤⇤⇤ -16.89⇤⇤⇤ -12.64⇤⇤ -13.67⇤⇤
12 Months: (5.85) (5.72) (5.71) (5.62)
T*D 16.64⇤ 16.86⇤⇤ 8.93 11.05
(8.58) (8.27) (8.55) (8.33)
Re-Employed After T -17.39⇤⇤⇤ -17.33⇤⇤⇤ -12.69⇤⇤ -13.64⇤⇤
15 Months: (5.82) (5.69) (5.68) (5.58)
T*D 17.05⇤⇤ 16.89⇤⇤ 8.25 9.98
(8.57) (8.23) (8.50) (8.21)
Re-Employed After T -16.85⇤⇤⇤ -16.58⇤⇤⇤ -11.83⇤⇤ -13.11⇤⇤
18 Months: (5.89) (5.74) (5.75) (5.67)
T*D 17.64⇤⇤ 17.10⇤⇤ 8.27 10.64
(8.48) (8.10) (8.42) (8.13)
Cox Regression T -0.39⇤⇤ -0.38⇤⇤ -0.24 -0.27⇤
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
T*D 0.48⇤⇤ 0.46⇤⇤ 0.22 0.26
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
N 2,342 2,342 2,342 2,342
Note: This table provides the regression discontinuity estimates of Equation 1, augmented
by an indicator variable for whether the value of diﬀerent income and wealth measures (all
deflated to 2004 values) exceeds the sample median in the year before job loss, as well
as interactions between that indicator and the other regressors. For example, in the first
column for Re-Employed After 15 Months we find that the average household below the
median is 17.39% less likely to be re-employed after 15 months. For the above-median house-
holds, the eﬀect estimate (the sum of the two coeﬃcients T + T*D, -17.39% + 17.05%)
is virtually zero, and not statistically significant at any conventional level, F(1,1552)=0.00,
Prob>F=0.96. Non-employment durations are censored when unemployment benefit ex-
pires after 2 years. Standard errors, clustered by firm, are reported in parentheses.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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